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Efficient Signature Scheme for Delivering Authentic
Control Commands in the Smart Grid
Neetesh Saxena, Member, IEEE, and Santiago Grijalva, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Enabling secure delivery of control commands and
alert messages is one of the critical requirements of smart
grid communications. If adversaries were to gain access, they
could alter or send malicious commands from the control center,
intended to the Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs). These malicious commands could
disrupt power system operations and cause damage to power
devices. In this paper, we propose an efficient signature scheme
for ensuring the delivery of only legitimate commands over the
communication network. We propose efficient signatures using
hash that are sent by the control center along with commands
for protecting command alteration over the network, which
also provide sender authenticity by verifying the signatures at
the RTU/IED. By using the proposed scheme, both random
and malicious commands sent by an adversary are discarded.
The security analysis shows that the scheme is secure against
replay, repudiation, and impersonation attacks. The performance
evaluation and prototype simulation show that our signature
scheme using SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 is feasible, and can be
used for communications from the control center to the field.
Index Terms—Smart grid security, power system communi-
cations, malicious commands, short signature, security attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Smart Grid (SG) is a modernized electricity deliverysystem, which relies heavily on two-way communica-
tions, information, and software to optimize control and to
achieve advanced grid functionalities. The smart grid relies
on the capability of transmitting accurate data and control
commands in a timely and secure manner [1]. If an adversary
gains unauthorized access to the grid control system, she
can perform various types of security attacks. Some types of
attacks, such as reply attacks [2], are difficult to detect. In this
paper, we consider a traditional Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) control scenario. This model considers
a central Supervisory Node (SN) (such as the Control Center
(CC)) and a remote Control Node (CN), usually represented
by Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs), which sense field quantities and actuate on
the various power devices. The SN is connected to various
CNs through different communication media and protocols.
An adversary who has gained access to the network can send
malicious commands or can modify transmitted commands
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and data that may result in disruption to the physical power
system.
There are various communication technologies and proto-
cols used in power system SCADA. An important standard
for transmission of command messages is IEC 60870-5-
101, which defines power system monitoring, control and
associated communications for tele-control, tele-protection,
and associated telecommunications. This standard is compat-
ible with IEC 60870 part 5-1 to 5-5 and uses a standard
asynchronous serial tele-control channel interface between
the Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and the Data Circuit-
Terminating Equipment (DCE). IEC 60870 is based on En-
hanced Performance Architecture (EPA) that considers only
the physical, data-link, and application layers of the OSI
model [3]. IEC 60870 was originally developed for serial
communications, but with the subsequent release of the IEC
60870-5-104 standard in 2000, the same serial frames are
allowed to be transmitted over TCP/IP [4]. This protocol
specification is suitable for communications between different
components within the substation network. At present, most of
the power utilities use Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3)
for real-time communications between the supervisory and
control nodes. DNP3 is highly standardized, with relatively
high compatibility and inter-operability between devices from
different manufacturers. This protocol consists of three layers:
data-link, application, and transport pseudo layers [5]. We
use DNP3/C37.118 protocol packet format to send a control
command and/or alert message.
Fig. 1: A communication scenario between the supervisory
and control nodes in the smart grid.
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A. Research Problem and Challenges
Figure 1 illustrates the system model considered in this
paper including supervisory and control nodes. Here, a su-
pervisory node can correspond to the control center or a
microgrid central controller. The control nodes on the other
hand are closer to the electrical devices and can correspond
to a substation Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), an Intelligent
Electronic Device (IED), the smart meter, etc. The operator at
the control center is responsible for making decisions based
on the operating conditions of the power system and sends
control commands to different power devices at the substation
in order to operate the power system as planned. An adversary
in the smart grid can alter the power system dynamics by
malicious yet valid commands over the wireless network.
It is therefore required to analyze resiliency of the system
to malicious command attacks. A promising direction is to
secure the power network against malicious commands trying
to change the state of the power system by actions, such
as opening circuit breakers. The smart grid network must
have a mechanism that ensures that the control node receives
control commands and alert messages over the communication
network that were actually sent by the legitimate supervisory
node. Since the latency requirements for control commands
are also crucial, the mechanism must be fast and efficient. In
some cases a control arming signal is sent to the RTU as alert
message to make sure that the command can get to the actual
address and be executed. Upon confirmation by the operator,
the command is actually executed by the RTU/IED. This
command arming can be represented as an alarm by the control
node. The scenario considered has following requirements and
challenges:
• Since the supervisory node communicates frequently with
the control nodes in order to exchange control commands
and alert messages, the generated communication over-
head must be as low as possible.
• The supervisory and control nodes must not be able
to perform repudiation attacks while transmitting and
receiving control commands and alert messages. Also, the
supervisory node (malicious one, such as insider attacker)
must not be able to perform impersonation and replay
attacks.
In order to protect the smart grid communications between
the supervisory and control nodes, a scheme must be designed
that it carries out semantic analysis as follows:
• A module at the supervisory node generates a fresh
command and sends it to the respective control node with
fresh information.
• A module at the control node is activated immediately
after receiving a command from the supervisory node,
which could verify whether the received command is
legitimate or malicious.
There are two different kinds of malicious command behav-
iors: (i) the command has different behavior than a normal op-
eration, such as not a regular command, suspicious command
for a critical power component, uncommon command for
opening transmission lines, etc., and (ii) the command was sent
by a malicious user or adversary. We capture first command
behavior by using an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with
defined rules and later command behavior is verified by the
proposed scheme.
Let consider a real-world smart grid scenario. During
polling request, the supervisory node (control center) sends
a command to one or more control nodes (RTUs) over the
communication network, and asks to send their data. As a
polling response, the control nodes send their measurement
data to the supervisory node. During polling request, the RTU
at a substation checks whether the command was sent by a
legitimate control center or not. The RTU verifies the signa-
ture of the sender with message integrity. Normally, sending
such commands by the control center is a part of its daily
routine activities, which does not involve confidentiality of the
information. By the time of polling response, the RTUs send
periodic measurement data of different power components
deployed at the substations to the control center. We must
also protect this transmitted data from the adversary over an
insecure network. In order to secure measurement data sent
from the substation RTU to the control center, we propose an
encryption over the transmitted data. However, in this paper,
we only focus on accurate and correct command delivery, not
the encryption of transmitted data. In a real world scenario,
the utilities either protect their communication networks using
Virtual Private Network (VPN) or simply do not involve any
protection due to a large deployment cost. Even in the presence
of a VPN network, the adversary can modify the measurement
data values or the commands just before the starting points
of the VPN at the substation. The traditional techniques of
encryption (DES, AES) and signing (RSA, DSA, ECDSA) are
not suitable for encrypting the transmitted data and generating
the signatures for commands delivery in the smart grid network
due to generating large overheads. Such a scenario involves
frequent communications between the supervisory and control
nodes, which requires an efficient and lightweight scheme.
B. Our Contribution
We propose an efficient short signature scheme for secure
delivery of commands and alert messages from the supervisory
node to the control node. Our scheme is based on the security
of one-way function and subset resilience of hash functions.
We propose to generate the signatures at the supervisory node
by using a hash function, and each time, send a new signature
along with the message to the control node. Upon receiving
the message and the signature, the control node verifies the
received signature by using a one-way function and checks
the message integrity by computing the hash of the message
and comparing it with the received hash. The following are
our contributions in this paper:
• Our scheme ensures the correct and accurate delivery of
control commands and alert messages from the super-
visory node to the control node by using efficient one-
time signatures that provide authenticity and integrity of
the messages. One-time signatures are digital signatures
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that can be used to sign a single message for each pair
of verification and signing keys. Our scheme generates
efficient (speedy) and light-weighted (low overhead) one-
time signatures that provide strong unlinkability and does
not require public key infrastructure. One-time signatures
enable quick system recovery even if the system is
compromised (worst case).
• As these commands and alert messages are not confiden-
tial, avoiding encryption improves the overall efficiency
of the system, and also reduces the communication la-
tency of the messages.
• The proposed signature scheme generates a lower over-
head, as only one hash and one concatenation opera-
tions are used along with m−hash operations to gen-
erate m−signatures. Signature verification depends upon
the number of communication instances and the types
of communication (unicast, multicast, and broadcast).
The overall overhead is lower compared to the existing
schemes, hence meeting the time requirements of the
control application.
The proposed scheme can also be utilized in the transmis-
sion of messages from the control node to the supervisory
node. Some of these messages could be a specific alert mes-
sage, suspect activity notification, etc. The proposed scheme
is specific to the wireless communication, as the secret key is
computed at the sender and the receiver based on wireless
transmission error. The proposed scheme supports required
features and does not require any modifications to the current
communication infrastructure in smart grids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work in the context of signature schemes.
Section 3 presents the adversary model. Section 4 describes
our signature scheme. Section 5 presents security analysis.
Section 6 presents performance evaluation and experimental
analysis. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusion of this
work. Table I describes various abbreviations and symbols
used in this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present work related to the signature
schemes. Several researchers have developed attacks scenarios
and their detection mechanism for smart grid applications,
such as IEC 60870-5-101 [3], Maynard et al. [4], and Temple
et al. [6]. Lin et al. [7] performed a security analysis on
malicious control commands detection. However, a solution
that could prevent malicious commands to be accepted by the
control node has not been proposed. A feasible solution is to
impose signatures over commands whenever they are sent as
a part of polling request or control actions.
In general, few lightweight signature schemes are available
in literature. In this direction, Perrig [8] proposed a one-time
signature scheme, called BiBa. The scheme provides short
signature and fast verification, but the signature generation
is time consuming. Thereafter, Reyzin et al. [9] proposed
a scheme, named Better than BiBa or HORS that generates
TABLE I: Symbols And Abbreviations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
SN Supervisory node –
CN Control node –
idsn Identity of the supervisory node 128
idcn Identity of the control node 128
H() Cryptographic hash function –
H A family of hash functions –
h hash code from H() 160-384
f() One-way function –
pk A set of public keys of the SN 160-384
pki A public key 160-384
sk A set of private keys of the SN 160-384
ski A private key 160-384






Sign() Signature generation function –
KeyGen() Key generation function –
Ver() Verification function –
MTU Maximum transmission unit Variable
|| Concatenation –
signatures efficiently. However, this method has a limita-
tion that if an adversary is able to swap the order of the
signatures in a set, an attack can be performed [10]. The
Powerball scheme [11] proposed by Mitzenmacher generates
small size signatures, however, the cost of online signing is
large. Another scheme, named TV-HORS [12] was proposed
by Wang et al., which provides fast signing/verification and
buffering-free data processing. However, the scheme uses a
relatively large public key of size 8-10 KB. HORS++ scheme
[13] proposed by Pieprzyk et al. is a variant of HORS that
also uses a large key size. Thereafter, a one-time signature
scheme was proposed by Zaverucha et al. [14] that supports
aggregation and batch verification. Other signature schemes
have also been proposed for the smart grid network [15], [16],
[17]. Li et al. [15] presented an approach to authenticate data
aggregation in smart grid via deploying signature aggregation.
Vaidya et al. [16] proposed elliptic curve cryptography-based
digital signature scheme for remote access to home area net-
works. Fu et al. [17] proposed a multi-dimensional aggregation
signature scheme for smart grid communications. However,
none of these schemes fulfills our communication and system
requirements for secure command delivery. Yavuz et al. [18]
presented a real-time broadcast authentication scheme based
on RSA and condensed-RSA. However, the scheme generates
a large storage and communication overheads.
Our work represents a departure from the existing works in
the following way:
• Our scheme uses a set of hash functions, instead of
a single hash function to generate signatures, and also
maintains strong message integrity. A one-way function
used in our scheme is announced later at the time of
revealing the signatures. This provides stronger security
and leaves less time to the adversary to make a forgery
attempts on signatures.
• Our signature scheme utilizes the advantages of methods
BiBa [8], Better than Biba [9] and the scheme in [12], and
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addresses their disadvantages. BiBa has a large signing
time, and Better than Biba does not have randomness
to the input of hash function. The scheme in [12] has a
quite large public key size. Our scheme has faster signing
time by using only one hash operation. The scheme also
provides randomness to hash, and uses a fixed size (160-
384 bits) public and private keys by computing hash over
keys to generate one-time signatures.
• In a real scenario, a command can be sent using ra-
dio and/or carrier communications. Our scheme uses
DNP3/C37.118 format for commands delivery in the
simulated experiment.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that an adversary A tries to perform imperson-
ation attacks on behalf of the supervisory node in order to
send malicious commands to the control nodes. A may also
perform replay attacks by re-transmitting the commands sent
during previous sessions. Furthermore, there can be an attempt
of insider attack by the operator (as repudiation attack) at
the supervisory node, where he/she sends a command to the
control node and then later denies of sending the command.
We also assume that A knows the possible selection of
hash functions used in our scheme and tries to learn some
information from the generated hash.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we propose a signature scheme for the
correct and accurate delivery of control commands and alert
messages. Our scheme proposes lightweight signatures with
message integrity for critical as well as non-critical commands
and/or alert messages, such as sending an “open breaker"
command for a generator. A communication scenario with
our proposed scheme is illustrated in Figure 2, where we only
focus on commands and/or alerts with digital signatures part in
this paper. In our signature scheme, the supervisory node sends
either a single or a set of generated public keys pk in cipher
form to the respective control node depending upon the types
of communication (unicast, multicast, and broadcast). These
pk keys can also be sent to the control nodes in advance.
A. Efficient Signatures for Control Commands
We propose a short and efficient signature scheme to
maintain authentication and integrity of commands and alert
Fig. 2: Proposed scheme confirms the correct delivery of the
commands over the network.
Fig. 3: Signature generation at the supervisory node and its
verification at the control node.
messages, as illustrated in Figure 3. This scheme is suitable
to be used by the supervisory node for unicast, multicast, and
broadcast communications of commands and alert messages.
A broadcast/multicast scenario is presented in Figure 4, in
which the supervisory node (control center) sends a com-
mand to various control nodes (RTUs) simultaneously over
the communication network. In order to secure measurement
data sent from the substation RTU to the control center, we
propose the encryption of transmitted data. In this paper, we
only focus on accurate and correct command delivery, not
the encryption of transmitted data. We assume that a secret
key is shared between the control center and the substation
RTU. For ensuring correct and accurate delivery of control
commands from the control center to the substation RTU, our
scheme delivers a one-time signature along with the command.
The reason of choosing one-time signatures is quick system
recovery. Our scheme does not provide encryption to the
transmitted commands and alert messages due to the fact that
the confidentiality of information is not our concern, rather the
focus is to verify the supervisory node’s authenticity and the
message integrity. Another advantage of disabling encryption
is that it restricts the generated overhead to be remained low.
Furthermore, received signature at the control node must be
verified and matched with the supervisory node’s signature.
Our scheme is based on a set of cryptographic hash func-
tions H(), such as SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 that main-
tains collision resistance. The SN can use any one of these
hash functions (SHA1, SHA256, or SHA384) as H(), which
generates a hash code h with specific length depending upon
the hash function used (160, 256, or 384 bits, respectively).
Various steps of the scheme are described in Algorithm 1.
The method is based on [9] that splits hash code h into l
Fig. 4: A broadcast (or multicast) scenario between the super-
visory node and all control nodes at the substation(s).
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substrings of length log2 n each, where n is the number of
strings, each with length m. Each hash substring will generate
a different binary code, interpretation of which will be a unique
and random integer number. This integer value will decide the
sequence of next signature value from the set and will provide
randomness to the process of sending a command with one-
time signature. Let us interpret each substring as an integer
and form a subset N of size at most l. We assume a one-way
function f() that works on m-bit string. The integer value
equivalent to the hash of a substring provides randomness to
the order of public keys and acts as an index to match the
f(signature) with the correct public key. Note that in order
to build a signature scheme that can sign l-bit messages, we




) ≥ 2l. The public key and
signature sizes are linear in n and l, respectively. We assume a
set {1, 2, ..., n} as N , and a hash function H() that maps input
message msg (0 ≤ msg ≤ (nl)) to msg’s l-element subset of
N . Note that the scheme in [8] uses a bijective function in
order to achieve subset of N . Our selection of using H() over
bijective function improves the efficiency and also makes it
infeasible to find two messages msg1 and msg2 such that
H(msg2) ⊆ H(msg1).
Because utilizing shared symmetric key does not provide
non-repudiation, we construct signatures based on asymmetric
keys, in which each party has a private key and a public key.
In our scheme, only the supervisory node has a set of private
and public keys as the signatures can only be created by the
supervisory node, and are only verified by the control node.
Our scheme generates n random fixed-length private keys
sk = (H(sk1), H(sk2), ...,H(skn)) from m-bit strings, and
computes respective public keys as pk = (pk1, pk2, ..., pkn)
at the supervisory node. Here, pk1 = f(H(sk1)), ..., pkn =
f(H(skn)). Furthermore, we interpret m-bit message msgi
as an integer value between 0 and 2m-1. Consider {i1, ..., il}
be the msgi’s l-element subset of N . These l-element subset
can be used to generate signatures for unicast, multicast,
and broadcast communications. In order to make available
the public key pki to the control node, each public key pki
can be sent (in cipher form) to a control node when the
supervisory node sends the acknowledgment ack of a received
frame/packet to the respective control node (which is not a
part of this scheme). In fact, the supervisory node can provide
a complete set pk to each control node in advance that can
be used over a period of time for multicast and broadcast
communications for non-critical commands with no restriction
of a shared secret key expiration. However, the pki key is used
only once per signature.
There is no need of distributing the key as the same key is
generated at both ends independently. We consider that a same
secret key is generated at the control node as SKcni and at the
supervisory node as SKsni . The key expiration time depends
upon the frequency of the wireless transmission error in the
wireless communications. We consider the key expiration time
as 5 minutes. For wired communications, we still believe that
there is a secret key, depending upon wireless transmission
error at both ends, which is used between the supervisory
node and the control node. The purpose of this secret key
Algorithm 1 Proposed Signature Algorithm
Key Generation at the supervisory node
Input: Parameters n: number of strings, m: length of each
string, and l: number of substrings;
Generate n random m-bit strings sk1, sk2, ..., skn;
Generate hash of strings as H(sk1), H(sk2), ...,H(skn);
Compute pki = f(H(ski)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
Output: pk = (l, pk1, pk2, ..., pkn) and sk =
(l,H(sk1), H(sk2), ...,H(skn));
Signature Generation at the supervisory node
Input: Interpret message msgi as integer value, shared secret
key SKsni , and a set of private keys sk = (sk1, sk2, ..., skn);
1. Let h = H(idsn||msgi||SKsni ) for unicast commu-
nication used for critical commands, otherwise h =
H(idsn||msgi) for multicast and broadcast communications
used for non-critical commands and alert messages;
2. Split h into l substrings h1, h2, ..., hl of length log2 n
bits each;
3. Interpret each hj as an integer ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ l;
Output: A set of signatures = (si1 , si2 , ..., sil ), message
msgi, and timestamp value Ti, where si = H(ski);
Signature Verification at the control node
Input: Message msgi, a set of signatures = (s1, s2, ..., sl),
received timestamp value Ti, and public key pk =
(pk1, pk2, ..., pkn);
1. Check whether Tcurr ≤ Ti +Tth, where Tcurr is current
timestamp value and Tth is threshold timestamp value. If
yes, proceed further otherwise, discard the command.
2. Compute h = Hash(idsn||msgi||SKcni ) for unicast com-
munication used for critical commands, otherwise compute
h = H(idsn||msgi) for multicast and broadcast communica-
tions used for non-critical commands and alert messages;
3. Split h into l substrings h1, h2, ..., hl of length log2 n
bits each;
4. Interpret each hj as an integer ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ l;
Output: “Accept" if for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, f(sj) = pkij ;
“Reject" otherwise;
is to encrypt the transmitted measurement values from the
control node to the supervisory node using a dynamic secret
generation scheme [19]. In case of unicast communication, the
generated signatures can only be used within the expiration
of secret key SKsni . Once the key is expired, the supervisory
node provides a new set of the pki keys, i.e., pk to the respec-
tive control node. The supervisory node discloses private keys
{H(sk1), H(sk2), ...,H(skl)} as signatures {si1 , si2 , ..., sil}
(based on hj order of sequence), where ij are integer values
of hj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Multicast/broadcast communications
are preferred over unicast communication for non-critical
command/alert messages to various control nodes. It reduces
the generated overhead per message per control node as well as
the overall overhead of the system. On receiving the signature
along with message msgi, the control node generates hj and
interprets them as integer values {i1, ..., il} between 0 and
2m-1 as message l-element subset of N . Each control node
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just follows simple commitment, computes f(sj), and verifies
whether it matches with pkij . In practice, instead of searching
from i = 0 to l, the control node starts searching with i = l/2
and proceed in both directions. We perform binary search to
find equivalent computed value f(sj) faster in a set of pkij .
The msgi in idsn||msgi||SKsni changes for each unique
command targeted from supervisory node to control node.
Also, the secret key SKsni changes frequently in every
few minutes. These both parameters change the value of
idsn||msgi||SKsni within few minutes. The old values of
SKsn and SKcn are discarded after their expiration times
whereas the ski and pki are discarded after its one-time usage.
There is no need of synchronizing the SKsni and SKcni list
values as both keys are generated independently. Even, the
occasional loss of packet will not affect our scheme as the
scheme itself is based on the wireless transmission error.
B. Examples on Proposed Scheme
In this section, we provide two examples in order to
illustrate our scheme. The first example considers a multi-
cast communication scenario. The second example illustrates
signature generation and verification.
Example 1: Consider a scenario in multicast communica-
tions, in which the supervisory node provides a set of four
public keys {pk1, pk2, pk3, pk4} to two control nodes, say CN1
and CN2. After signing the message, the supervisory node
provides s1 signature to the CN1 and s2 signature to the CN2,
and the respective control node verifies the signatures. The
signatures s1 and s2 will never be re-used by the supervisory
node to any control node, even though each control node has
some unused signatures. Once the supervisory node utilizes
all the generated signatures, a new set of public keys will be
provided to each control node.
Example 2: Let us consider a simple example to un-
derstand the signature generation and verification. Assume
that m = 160, l = 3 and n = 16 under multicast/broadcast
communications. Initially, the supervisory node generates sk
= (H(sk1),...,H(sk16)) and pk = (pk1, ..., pk16), and sends
a set of public keys pk to the control node. Thereafter, the
supervisory node computes h = H(idsn||msg), splits it into
three substrings hi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) as h1, h2, h3, and interprets
each hi as integer ij (1 ≤ j ≤ 3). Here, hash function provides
a security level as (l × log n), i.e., 12 bits. It produces three
hash substrings, each with 4 bits in length. Consider i1, i2,
and i3 are 2, 9, and 15, respectively. Thus, the supervisory
node reveals H(sk2), H(sk9), H(sk15) as signatures s1, s2,
s3, and sends them to any three control nodes along with
message msg, which is actually a command/alert message.
On receiving the signature and the message, each control
node directly computes f(sj) and verifies whether one of
the public keys pkij (1 ≤ j ≤ 3) in a set matches with
f(sj). In a real scenario, in order to provide sufficient security
level, we consider n as a large number where log2 n is at
least 160 bits. However, in case of unicast communication,
on receiving a signature and the command message from
the supervisory node, the respective control node computes
h, generates substrings hj , interpret each hj as ij , and then
verifies whether f(sj) = pkij . For each subsequent signature
within the expiry of secret key SKcni , the control node
can directly compute f(sj) and compare f(sj) = pkij , as
the control node can use previously generated hj and ij
because of having same H(idsn||msgi||SKcni) for exactly
same command. For unicast communication, the security level
(l× log n) of hash string should be at least 160 bits. One can
consider l = 16, n = 210 = 1024, or l = 20, n = 28 = 256 to
maintain a standard security level of 160 bits hash code.
V. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed
scheme with its formal and provable security model.
A. Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of our short
signature scheme. Given a message msg, the probability of
finding a signature is equal to the probability of finding at
least one two-way collision, i.e., at least two m-bit strings, say
ska and skb, have the same f(H(ska))
?
= f(H(skb)) when
uniformly randomly chosen from n such strings. The security
of the signature depends on the fact that the adversary has
few forge signatures and therefore has a small probability to
find a collision when uniformly randomly chosen t signatures
from n such strings as Prob = 1 − ∏t−1i=1(n− in ) ≈ 1 −
e
t(t+ 1)
2n [8]. However, we increased the security by using
a multi-round scheme, instead of two-way collisions similar
to [8] (refer proof), where only the strings that have a k1-
way collision in the first round proceed in the next round. We
prove the security strength of our scheme by the following
properties:
Property 1: Adversary A cannot perform replay and imper-
sonation attacks over the communication network between the
supervisory node and the control node.
In our scheme, each command message is sent with a
timestamp (or nonce) value from the supervisory node to
the control node. This timestamp value is valid for a short
period of time based on the propagation time between the
supervisory node and the respective control node. Once the
threshold time for accepting the message is over, the control
node discards the message. If A sends a previously captured
message to the control node, the control node discards the
message due to invalid timestamp value. If A sends any old
signature to the control node, the control node simply discards
the message as the signature is invalid. Furthermore, if A acts
as a supervisory node for the control node, the control node
verifies the signature received with the message and finds it
different than the earlier received as public key pki. This was
also proved in [8].
Property 2: Adversary A is not able to forge the strong
one-way function used in our scheme.
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We can define a strong one-way function as follow:
Definition 1: A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is said to be
strongly one-way, if the following conditions hold:
• Easy to compute: There exists a polynomial-time algo-
rithm Algo on input x, such that f(x) = Algo(x).
• Hard to invert: For each probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm Algo
′
with a polynomial p and sufficiently
large n: Pr(Algo
′
(f(x)) ∈ f−1f(x)) < 1/p(n).
We use secure hash function, such as SHA1, SHA256 or
SHA384 as a strong one-way function [20]. It is easy to com-
pute its output value (hash), but is not possible (impractically
difficult) to reverse the operation. These functions are secure
till date against different attacks, including collision attacks.
Therefore, our selection of SHA1, SHA256 or SHA384 as
strong one-way function is completely safe.
Property 3: The subset of hash functions used in the
proposed scheme is a subset-resilience.
Let H = {Hi,n,l} be a family of functions, where Hi,n,l
maps an input of arbitrary length to a subset of size at most l of
the set {0, 1, ..., n-1}. Note that for each n and l, H contains
a number of functions, which are indexed by i. Moreover,
assume that there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given i,
1n, 1l and msg, computes Hi,n,l(msg) [9].
Definition 2: H is said to be r-subset-resilient, if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A,
Pr
i
[(msg1,msg2, ...,msgr+1)← A(i, 1n, 1l)
s. t.: Hi,n,l(msgr+1) ⊆ ∪rj=1Hi,n,l(msgj)] < negl(n, l).
For r = 1, the definition can be realized using only collision-
resilient hash families. Namely, if H is a collision-resilient
hash function family, and S is a subset-selection algorithm,
then H(S)H∈H is a 1-subset-resilient family. For r > 1, the
definition of using only common complexity-theoretic assump-
tions is an open problem [21]. However, it is reasonable to
assume that selecting subset via cryptographic hash functions,
such as SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 satisfies the definition
for small values of r.
Property 4: Adversary A cannot create or forge the signa-
ture of the supervisory node in our scheme.
The security proof for our scheme follows directly from
subset-resilience of hash functions, and the one-way property
of function f(). The generated signatures in our scheme
are unforgeable against r-time chosen plaintext attack as we
consider hash functions, such as SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384,
of r-subset-resilient and a strong one-way function f(), which
is also one of these hash functions. We use SHA1, SHA256,
and SHA384 hash functions with 160, 256, and 384 bits of
hash code, respectively, which are considered a secure level
as per the current security standard. However, companies, such
as Microsoft and Google, have decided to discontinue SHA1
after 2016 [22]. Security systems will therefore be migrating
SHA1 to other forms of security, accordingly. A combination
of l and n, such as l = 16, n = 210 = 1024, or l = 40, n
= 24 = 16 can be used depending upon the applications and
requirements. If A tries to forge a signature depending upon
whether A uses a new element of N or re-uses the previous
revealed signatures, an attempt to do will be failed. The
reason is that the supervisory node does not re-use previously
revealed signatures. Also, A cannot choose the same subset
as the supervisory node selects because the supervisory node
modifies msgi using the current secret key before generating a
hash code that A does not know. Therefore, A cannot forge the
signatures of the supervisory node. Furthermore, in our scheme
unicast communications are used for the delivery of critical
commands. Since A does not know the secret key SKcni ,
it cannot compute a correct h. For non-critical commands
and alert messages, our scheme uses multicast and broadcast
communications. Even if A attempts to replace the signature
with a forge signature, the control node will not be able to
match the signature value with the public key value (earlier
received from the supervisory node).
B. Provable Security of the Scheme
This section discusses the provable security of the proposed
scheme, particularly, the practice-oriented provable security.
A system is practice-oriented provable secure if its security
requirements of the concrete objects, such as hash functions
and block ciphers with fix key sizes, and assumptions about the
hardness of certain computations are stated. We assume that
the adversary has access to the system and has enough compu-
tational resources for efficient computations. Traditionally, the
provable security is asymptotic that classifies the hardness of
computational problems using polynomial-time reducibility. It
also emphasizes the use of the Random Oracle (RO) model
that are assessed with regards to their usefulness, such as
hash, encryption, and decryption random oracles. Basically, a
random oracle is a theoretical black box that responds to each
unique query with a random response chosen uniformly from
its output domain. When a query is repeated, a random oracle
responds in the same way each time a query is submitted.
Almost all modern security proofs take the reduction approach
and rely on the hardness of some mathematical problem in
order to prove their security.
1) Formal Security Model with Game-based Approach: We
present a formal security model that consists of two elements:
1) Let us consider that an arbitrary, probabilistic, and
polynomial-time adversary can interact with legitimate
users of the smart grid system. The adversary can re-
trieve any message over an insecure network and also an
output of the massage of its choice from a hypothetical
probabilistic algorithm called a challenger.
2) In order to compromise the system and to forge a mes-
sage, an adversary must be able to generate the correct
signature of the actual sender. In fact, the adversary must
generate or capture the private key of the sender and
create a forged signature.
Let us follow a game-based approach to evaluate our
scheme. In our security model, the adversary interacts with
a hypothetical probabilistic challenger algorithm. This chal-
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lenger responds to all the queries made by the adversary. The
game terminates when an adversary announces its decision.
The adversary wins the game if it can correctly guess the
security parameters and break the system. A system is proved
secure if the probability that an arbitrary adversary breaks the
system is small.
The challenger generates an asymmetric key pair (ski, pki)
of the appropriate security level. Now, the adversary’s algo-
rithm is executed, which takes a public key (pki) and a security
parameter (n) as inputs. The adversary asks the challenger to
generate a signature (si) for a message (msgi) of its choice.
The challenger does the same using a signature generation
algorithm and the private key (ski) of the actual sender
(control center). The adversary is deemed to have broken the
system if the signature verification algorithm concludes that
si, generated by A, is a valid signature for the message msgi.
Brute force attack analysis is one of the best ways of
analyzing the security of the system. This security parameter
typically dictates the appropriate length of the public and
private keys in order to keep the system secure in today’s
world. In the brute force attack analysis, an adversary evaluates
all the possible combinations of a key if it knows the length
of the key. The adversary comes to a “true" conclusion if one
of the key’s combinations was used by the sender for signing
a message. However, if the length of the key is large enough,
it becomes infeasible and impractical for A to compute all the
possible combinations within the key validity time.
2) Digital Signature Scheme: A digital signature is a source
authentication segment appended at the end of a message. The
sender generates a digital signature using a signing algorithm
that takes a message to be signed and the user’s private key
as inputs. The recipient performs the signature verification
using a verification algorithm, the message, the signature, and
the sender’s public key as input. Note that it is infeasible to
produce a signature for a message without knowledge of the
private key of the sender.
Definition 3: (Digital signature scheme). For a message
spaceM, a digital signature scheme Σ is a triple of algorithms
Σ = (KeyGen, Sign,Ver).
KeyGen() → (sk, pk): A probabilistic key generation algo-
rithm that takes no input, and generates a set of signing
(private) and public keys.
Sign(ski,msgi)→ si: A probabilistic signing algorithm that
takes as input a signing key ski and a message msgi ∈ M,
and outputs a signature si.
Ver(pki,msgi, si) → {0, 1}: A deterministic verification al-
gorithm that takes as input a public key pki, a message msgi,
and a signature si, and outputs either 0 (invalid) or 1 (valid).
Definition 4: (Correctness). A digital signature scheme is
correct if for all msgi ∈ M, all (ski, pki) ← KeyGen(), and
all si ← Sign(ski,msgi), the Ver(pki,msgi, si) = 1 is a true
statement.
An adversary may attempt several possible security breach
goals: (i) Key recovery: tries to compute ski given the public
key pki, and acts as a signer, (ii) Universal forgery: com-
putes a valid signature si for a retrieved message msgi, and
(iii) Existential forgery: computes a valid signature si for
a message msgi of its choice. We can give the adversary
different powers. The adversary: (i) Key-only: receives pub-
lic key pki of the sender, (ii) Known-message: retrieves a
list of the message-signature pairs from a pre-selected list
of the messages, and (iii) Adaptive chosen-message: may
adaptively obtain signatures for the messages of its choices.
The best security notion is Existential Unforgeability under
Adaptive Chosen Message Attack (EU-CMA). We want to
verify SuccEU−CMAΣ (A) = Pr(ExpEU−CMAΣ (A) = 1).
In order to forge a signature for a message msgi, the
adversary submits a query to a challenger, which is a random
oracle. In our scheme, H is a hash family having different
hash functions H() that a challenger implements. The
adversary can obtain the hash values of the messages from
the challenger.
ChallengerROH (A)
H() : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n
Initialization: Hash-list ← φ
Query: If (hi,msgi) ∈ Hash-list for a msgi then return msgi
else msgi ← Z∗n
Add (hi,msgi) to the Hash-list and return msgi.
3) Game Approach: Let us consider a game-based scenario
in order to prove the security of the proposed scheme.
Game 0. This is the original EU-CMA game for the proposed
signature (PRO-SIG) scheme. Hence, SuccEU−CMAPRO−SIG(A) =
Pr(si).
Game 1. The adversary makes the first attempt to guess a
random private key ski. If the adversary can correctly guess
or retrieve the actual private key of the sender, it can break the
system by creating the correct but fake signature of the sender
(control center). However, since ski was chosen at random
from Z∗n (generated by a secure pseudorandom generator
PRG), the distributions are identical, so Pr(sk2) = Pr(sk1).
Therefore, A has no advantage in guessing the private key
correctly. Also, the private key is never sent over the network,
hence, A cannot retrieve the key from the network.
Game 2. In this game, an adversary tries to guess (hi,msgi)
in the Hash-list. In this second query attempt, the adver-
sary tries to correctly guess a message msgi and asks the
challenger to provide signature si = H(ski) for the chosen
message msgi. If A correctly guess the private key ski
and/or the message msgi, the game 0 and (game 1 and/or
game 2) will be equivalent. Assuming the adversary makes
queryr queries for generating random private keys ski and
queryh queries for the message integrity using H(). Therefore,
Pr(correct_guess) = 1/(queryr+queryh+1). Note queryh
will depend upon all the hash functions used in the scheme
(queryhSHA1 + queryhSHA256 + queryhSHA384 ).
Generally, the security of the cryptographic hash functions
can be proved by three different properties: pre-image resis-
tance, second pre-image resistance, and collision resistance.
Pre-image Resistance (PR): Given a hash hi, finding any
message msgi such that hi = H(msgi) is hard. Hash
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functions lacking this property are vulnerable to pre-image
attacks.
Second Pre-image Resistance (SPR): Given an input msg1,
finding another message msg2 (msg2 6= msg1) is hard such
that H(msg1) = H(msg2). This is also known as weak colli-
sion resistance. One-way hash functions lacking this property
are vulnerable to second pre-image attacks.
Collision Resistance (CR): It is hard to find two different
messages msg1 and msg2 such that H(msg1) = H(msg2).
Such a scenario is known as hash collision. This property is
also known as strong collision resistance. It requires a hash
value to be at least twice as required for pre-image resistance,
otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack.
We have used strong one-way hash functions, such as SHA1,
SHA256, and SHA384. Therefore, our scheme is secure against
these attack.
Pr[(msg1,msg2)← A(Σ, H) : msg1 6= msg2 ∧
H(msg1) = H(msg2)] ≤ (n).
There is no polynomial-time (efficient) algorithm that breaks
the pre-image of the hash. The bits of the message are nicely
mixed in a hash function to produce a hash code. Various
modular additions, bitwise operations (xor, rotations), and
compression functions are used in iterative mode for ensuring
high complexity and pseudo-randomness of the hash output. In
this way, the security is proved by these operational functions.
Game 3. The adversary may attempt to analyze the m-bit
private key ski and the generated hash codes by the hash
functions H(). In the proposed scheme, the length of the ski
key is 2048 bits, which generates 22048 different combinations
of a key. Therefore, it is impossible for an adversary to
generate or guess the exact private key ski. Hence, A has
no advantage over any other user in the system that could
correctly guess the private key.
AdvBruteForceski (A) = Pr[b = b
′
]− 1/2.
A has to make at least 21024 attempts to correctly guess
the private key using birthday paradox. Similarly, in order to
retrieve a correct hash code, A needs to make at least 280,
2128, and 2192 attempts, respectively, for SHA1, SHA256, and
SHA384. A will only be successful if it can retrieve the correct
private key from the signature.
Game 4. We will now prove our main theorem which states
that the proposed scheme is secure as long as the used func-
tions (families) provide standard security properties. These
properties are fulfilled by secure cryptographic hash functions.
We provide a standard security notion for the signature scheme
that considers EU-CMA attack.
Definition 5: A signature scheme is called existentially
unforgeable under a q-adaptive chosen message attack, if an
adversary A makes at most q-queries but has only negligible
success probability of winning the game.
We denote our signature scheme with security parame-
ter n as Sig(1n), key generation as KeyGen(1n), signa-
ture generation as Sign(ski, .), and signature verification as
Ver(pki,msg1, si), where si is a generated signature. Let
{(msgi, si)}q1 be the query-answer pairs of Sign(ski, .). The
standard security notion for our signature scheme under EU-
CMA can be represented using the following experiment:
Experiment ExpEU-CMAPRO−SIG(A)
Setup : (ski, pki)← KeyGen(1n),
Execution : (msg1, si)← ASign(ski,.)(pki).
Return 1, iff Ver(pki,msg1, si) = 1 and msg1 /∈ {msgi}q1.
else return 0.
For a success probability of A in this experiment, we define:
SuccEU−CMAPRO−SIG(A) = Pr[ExpEU−CMAPRO−SIG(A) = 1].
However, in our scheme, A can neither generate the same
signatures nor forge the public keys of the supervisory node.
The reason is because A cannot generate a shared secret key
that is used to transmit the public keys (in cipher form) from
the supervisory node to the control node.
We prove security of the scheme when H() is modeled as
a random oracle. Let t be an upper bound on the number
of instances of the scheme overall. Thus, we have a set
{hi,msgi}ti=1, where msgi 6= msgj for i 6= j. For the
exact statement in the proof we use the notion of insecu-
rity functions. An insecurity function InSecEU−CMAPRO−SIG(s, t, q)
describes the maximum success probability of an adversary
against the system of primitive s, running in time ≤ t, and







Theorem. Let n, v,msg ∈ N, F : {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}
a Second Pre-image Resistant (SPR) and Undetectable (UD)
one-way function family that maintains One-Wayness (OW).
Then, InSecEU−CMAPRO−SIG(1
n,m), t, 1), the insecurity of PRO-
SIG against EU-CMA attack is bounded by
InSecEU−CMAPRO−SIG(1
n,m), t, 1) ≤ InSecUDPRO−SIG(F , t′)
+m.max
A
{InSecOWPRO−SIG(F , t′′), InSecSPRPRO−SIG(F , t′′)}
where t′ = t+ 3m and t′′ = t+ 3m+ l [23].
Proof: Let us use contradiction. We assume that there exists
an adversary A that can produce existential forgeries for PRO-
SIG running an adaptive chosen message attack in time ≤ t
and with success probability SuccEU−CMAPRO−SIG(A) greater than
the claimed bound InSecEU−CMAPRO−SIG(1
n,m), t, 1). A random
oracle first runs the KeyGen() key generation to obtain a key
pair (ski, pki). In our scheme, the control center sends a set of
encrypted public keys pk to the substation using a secret key
SKsni . Therefore, A does not have the access to a public key,
say pk
′
i. A must know the one-way function f() in order to
generate a public key of the control center from the retrieved
signature, say, s
′
i. Even if A does this, the generated pk
′
i must
be the same as the one used from a set of the public keys
based on hj . This provides no advantage to A, as first A has
to correctly guess l and then choose the correct pk
′
i used by the
control center. This proves that the scheme is secure against
a random guessing.
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Now, let assume that A can retrieve a public key pk′i of
the control center and a signature s
′
i. An adversary correctly
guesses l, runs ASign(ski,.)(pk′i) and submits a query to a
random oracle for signing a message msg
′





i) and generates a signature s
′
i for A, where sk
′
i
is one of the randomly generated strings and s
′
i is a signature











i, and its goal is to retrieve the private key sk
′
i. The existence
of a function that combines these properties is equivalent to
the existence of a one-way function. Note that the second pre-
image resistant functions exist if a one-way function exists
[24]. We know the same for the undetectable functions, i.e., the
pseudorandom generators [25]. Using the assumptions about
the one-wayness and the second pre-image resistance of F ,
we can bound the success probability of A, i.e., SuccPRO(A),
when accessing m-signatures using a random oracle:
m.max
A
{InSecOWPRO−SIG(F , t′′), InSecSPRPRO−SIG(F , t′′)}
where t′′ = t + 3m + l is an upper bound for A’s run-
time accessing all three algorithms. The public key gener-
ation maintains one-wayness by using a one-way function
f() whereas the signature generation requires hashing of the
private key that maintains the pre-image resistance. We use
f() as a cryptographic hash function, which is also pre-image
resistant.
Next, we bound the difference between the success prob-
ability SuccPRO(A) using a random oracle and its success
probability SuccPEXP (A) in the original experiment (EXP).
If the first probability is greater than the latter, we already
have a contradiction. We assume that A asks for the signature
on one message msg
′
i and observes the behavior over M
distribution. We now consider an oracle that uses the possibly
different behavior of A when given different distributed inputs
to distinguish between the Public Key Distribution (PKD) and
Message Distribution (MD). We compute the distinguishing
advantage
AdvPKD,MD(A) = SuccPEXP (A)− SuccPRO(A).
We only need to consider the case when SuccPEXP (A) ≥
SuccPRO(A). In order words,
SuccPEXP (A) = AdvPKD,MD(A) + SuccPRO(A).
But, A has negligible advantage, as a pseudorandom generator
is used for the key distribution. This implies that:
AdvPKD,MD(A) ≤ InSecUDPRO−SIG(F , t′).
where t′ = t+ 3m. Now, putting all together,
SuccPEXP (A) ≤ InSecUDPRO−SIG(F , t′)
+m.max
A
{InSecOWPRO−SIG(F , t′′), InSecSPRPRO−SIG(F , t′′)}
where t′ = t + 3m and t′′ = t + 3m + l. This is
a contradiction. This proves that there is no such adver-
sary A that can produce existential forgeries in time ≤
t with success probability SuccEU−CMAPRO−SIG(A) greater than
InSecEU−CMAPRO−SIG(1
n,m), t, 1).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS
This section presents performance evaluation of our scheme.
We also discuss an experimental analysis of our simulation.
A. Performance Evaluation
Our signature scheme requires only two evaluations of the
hash function: one for signature generation and other for
signature verification. In addition, l evaluations of one-way
function f() and hash function H() for signature verification
are also required. Note that l varies in different scenarios
of unicast, multicast, and broadcast communications. In our
scheme, we consider a set of hash algorithms, such as {SHA1,
SHA256, SHA384} for selecting a hash function H() as well
as a one-way function f(). One of the advantages of using H()
instead of bijective function is that it removes the restriction
of a fixed length message (m-bit in length), as H() can
process the input of variable length. Our scheme allows the
mapping of elements in subset N starting from one element
and up to at most l elements. Hence, the supervisory node can
utilize efficient mapping based on the types of communication
(unicast, multicast, and broadcast) as well as the number
of communicated control nodes. Furthermore, our scheme
generates signatures of size l × m∗, signature cost as O(1),
key generation cost as O(n), public keys of size n×m∗ and
verification cost (l+1) as O(l), where m∗ size is 160-384 bits.
B. Experimental Analysis
In this work, we develop an experimental setup with a
co-simulator. The co-simulator uses JDK1.7 with Gridsim,
PowerWorld, MATLAB, and Java Agent Development Frame-
work (JADE) to implement communication and power system
scenarios between the control and the supervisory nodes. We
consider a 24 substations system case with 42 buses, 62 lines,
7 generators, 27 loads, 6 transformers, and 9 shunts. Table II
describes the selected ranges of the communication parameters
for our simulation, where C37.118 protocol supports data
packets with message passing. We simulate the system by
varying the baud rate from 100-9600 bits/sec, propagation
delay ranges from 10-100 ms, Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) ranges from 32-1024 bytes (with transport segment
1-249 bytes), and packet size varies from 50-1500 bytes.
The command types and its actions include changing
(open/close) the status of various power system components,
such as line status (LineStatus), generator status (GenSta-
tus), load status (LoadStatus), transformer status (modeled
as LineStatus), and shunt status (SSStatus). Figure 5 depicts
TABLE II: Parameters for Simulation Setup
Parameters Range Value Unit
Baud rate 100-9600 bits/sec
Propagation delay 10-100 ms
MTU 32-1024 bytes
Packet size 50-1500 bytes
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Fig. 5: A load profile for 30 timesteps as one timestep per
minute, and pass “Open Gen" command at timestep = 3.
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Fig. 6: Average time for signature generation and verification
using SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 in a scenario with baud
rate = 100 bits/sec, propagation delay = 100 ms, MTU = 237
bytes, and packet size = 500.
a simple scenario of load profile for 30 timesteps along
with the GenMVR when normal and “Open Gen" command
operations are performed. Figure 6 shows the average times
for the signature generation and verification by our scheme
considering three hash functions, i.e., SHA1, SHA256, and
SHA384. In the multicast and broadcast communications, the
supervisory node announces a hash function name (one-way
function by which a set of public keys is generated) at the
time of revealing its signatures. We consider a scenario with
the baud rate = 100 bits/sec, propagation delay = 100 ms, MTU
= 237 bytes, and packet size = 500 bytes. In this experiment,
we find that the signature generation and verification times for
1-5 data packets are (0.044-0.060, 0.096-0.189), (0.089-0.143,
0.104-0.190), and (0.119-0.167, 0.123-0.399) ms, respectively,
for SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384. SHA1 takes lesser times














BiBa [8] ml 2l+1 n 2n mn
Powerball [11] ml 2l+1 2n 2n mn
HORS [9] ml l+1 n 1 mn
Unicast Scheme# m∗ 1 1 1 m∗
Multicast Scheme# m∗l l+1 l 1 m∗l
Broadcast Scheme# m∗l l+1 n 1 m∗n
m∗ is at least 160-384 bits, Scheme# is our scheme.
(a) A GUI of command and alert
messages sending interface.
(b) A line status changes from
close to open by a command.
(c) A malicious signature genera-
tion and its detection.
(d) A legitimate signature gener-
ation and verification.
Fig. 7: A prototype of our scheme: transmission of a malicious
and legitimate commands from the control center to the RTUs
with signature generation and verification.
for the signature generation and verification as compared to
SHA256 and SHA384. However, SHA384 provides better hash
code security. The DNP3 protocol standard has a default
control duration time of 250 ms, and the channel latency could
be lowered to 15 ms with 9600 baud and 32 bytes of data [5].
In these scenarios, our scheme works very well and provides
an efficient and secure service to deliver control commands
and alert messages.
We also compare our signature scheme with the existing
schemes. As shown in Table III, our scheme is efficient than
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Fig. 8: Average time for signature generation and verification
by RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and our scheme using SHA1.
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the other schemes, and is suitable for the command and alert
messages to be sent from the supervisory node to the control
node over the network. Figure 7(a) shows a working prototype
of our scheme by which transmission of malicious as well as
legitimate commands are allowed from the control center to
the RTUs (such as change a line status in Figure 7(b)). The
scheme can detect and verify whether the sent command was
malicious (Figure 7(c)) or legitimate (Figure 7(d)).
Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b) show the average times for the
signature generation and verification, respectively, by the tradi-
tional signature schemes, such as RSA, DSA and ECDSA, and
our scheme using SHA1 hash function. These figures clearly
depict that the proposed scheme is efficient and have lower
signature generation and verification times in comparison to
the traditional signature schemes. Therefore, the proposed
scheme is practical, efficient, and reasonably effective in order
to deploy over the real smart grid network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described an efficient signature scheme for
secure communications between the supervisory node and
the control node in power system control and smart grid
applications. The supervisory node sends an acknowledgement
of the received frame/packet as well as encrypted public keys
(or public keys in a secure channel) to the control node. Our ef-
ficient signature scheme provides non-repudiation and message
integrity protection during unicast, multicast, and broadcast
communications of critical and non-critical commands and/or
alert messages. The security analysis of our scheme ensures
that our scheme defeats repudiation, replay, and impersonation
attacks over the network. Furthermore, performance evaluation
and experimental analysis of our scheme show that the process
of signature generation and verification is lightweight with
lower overhead and faster execution. We use all three func-
tions SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 in our scheme to provide
randomness of selecting hash function, which also improves
the overall security level of our scheme.
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